Get this from a library! Saídas de emergência em edifícios: NBR [ Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas.]. NBR – Saidas de emergencias em edificios.?NBR maio AVALIACAO DO SISTEMA DE ILUMINACAO EM ESCADAS. Thamirys Luyze. dos. Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 3, number 1, pages National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch as.
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Other versions of this item: Mantel, Rolf R, Kletzer and Brian D.
Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement
Juha Ilmari Seppala, Can public insurance reduce welfare? You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention 9077 item’s handle: See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
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Concentration and Profit Rates: New Evidence on an Old Issue
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Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement. Patrick Kehoe Fabrizio Perri. This study demonstrates how constrained efficient allocations can arise endogenously as equilibria in an economy with a limited ability to enforce contracts and with private agents behaving competitively, taking a set of taxes as given.
The taxes in this economy limit risk-sharing and arise in an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments of sovereign nations. The equilibrium allocations depend on governments choosing to tax both the repayment of international debt and the income from capital investment in their countries.
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